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RECENT DECISIONS
from access to the market was a "per se" offense. Moreover, it
was indicated that any elimination by conspiracy or combination
is equivalent to a conspiracy or combination to restrain price
competition, a goal illegal "per se." Thus, if it is illegal to con-
spire to a particular end, it would seem illegal to contract to
that same end.
It should be pointed out that General Motors might also en-
counter "conspiratorial" difficulties in attempting unilateral
enforcement of the provision. In Patterson v. United States,4
the court, when confronted with a conspiracy in restraint of trade on
the part of the officers and agents of a corporation, held that Sec-
tion 1 of the Sherman Act "includes conspiracies between com-
petitors, or between the officers and agents of a competitor on
its behalf against a competitor." 41
If there is an unreasonable restraint on interstate commerce,
it may result just as readily from a conspiracy on the part of those
associated under common ownership as from a conspiracy on the
part of those unassociated. 42  Thus, if the location clause, in and
of itself, were found to be the product of a conspiracy within the
corporate structure, it is conceivable that it would be violative of the
Sherman Act.
There can be little doubt that the instant decision is in line
with and controlled by Parke, Davis & Co. Mr. Justice Harlan
concedes this in his concurring opinion, but claims that that case
"represents basically unsound antitrust doctrine. 
. . .,,43 because
that opinion for practical purposes eliminated the manufacturer's
right to prescribe, in advance, the conditions upon which he will
refuse to sell. 4  The instant decision, however, seems to be
within the spirit of the antitrust laws and of the Sherman Act in
particular, "whose purpose was .. . to make . . .so far as Con-
gress could under our dual system, a competitive business
economy." 45
ANTITRUST LAw - MERGERS - SECTION 7 OF THE CLAYTON
ACT VIOLATED BY POTENTIAL THREAT TO COMPETITIN.-In an
antitrust action, the United States charged that the merger of two
competing grocery companies, creating the second largest chain in
40M2f Fed. 599 (6th Cir. 1915).
41 Id. at 618.
42 United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947).
43 United States v. General Motors, 384 U.S. 127, 148 (1966).
44 See Mr. Justice Harlan's dissent in United States v. Parke, Davis &
Co., 362 U.S. 29, 48 (1960).4 5 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 559
(1944).
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the locality, violated Section 7 of the Clayton Act. There hadbeen a trend indicating a decline in the number of single store
owners in this particular locality and a corresponding increase inthe number of chains of two or more stores. The Supreme Court,in reversing the district court's decision, held that the elimination
of one of the largest competitors, coupled with increased concentra-tion of the industry, necessarily resulted in an adverse effect on
competition and constituted a violation of the Clayton Act. UnitedStates v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
In order to stem the concentration of big industry and fore-
stall its adverse effect on the commercial market when it reaches
monopolistic proportions, 'Congress in 1890 enacted the ShermanAct.: As with most initial attempts at regulation, the ShermanAct was too broad and judicial interpretation became the only means
of effective administration. This legislation contained no provisions
restricting the gradual, piecemeal formation of monopolies; the
only situation where it could succesfully apply was a merger
which created an outright monopoly.2  A clear example of
such an outright monopoly occurred when eighteen of twenty-one
competing railroads entered into a price-fixing agreement. In hold-ing the agreement illegal, the Court looked exclusively at whetherthe given merger had an immediate effect on interstate commerce,
and would not consider any tendencies toward future monopoliza-
tion.3
In an attempt to remedy this deficiency, Congress, in 1914,
enacted Section 7 of the Clayton Act 4 which included provisionsfor such factors as the relevant market conditions and the trendtoward monopolistic concentration. Unfortunately, its authority
was limited exclusively to instances of concentration through stock
acquisition. Subsequent cases interpreting section 7 did not ex-pand on the express language of the statute and held that monopo-listic formations through the acquisition of assets of another corn-
26 Stat. 209 (1890). The relevant part of the Sherman Act states that"every con ract, combination in th  form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy,
in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreignnations" is illegal, and that "every person who shall monopolize, or attemptto monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, tomonopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several Stateg,or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor. ....2 See VAN sCIs, UNDERSTANDING THE ANTITRUST LAWS 20-24 (1963).3 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290, (1897).4 38 Stat. 730 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). Section 7 of the'ClaytonAct as it was originally enacted provided "that no corporation engaged incommerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly,, the whole or any part of thestock or other share capital of another corporation engaged also in commeice,
where the effect of such acquisition may be to substantially lessen com-Petition between the corporation whose stock is so acquired and the corpora-'t6on making the acquisition, or to restrain such commerce in any section orcommunity, or tend to create a monopoly of any line of commerce."
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pany did not violate the statute.5 In order to effectuate broader
coverage, the Celler-Kefauver Amendment of 19506 was enacted
whereby stocks and assets were placed on an equal footing and
disproportionate acquisitions of either were forbidden.
Under this amendment, a merger is a violation if "in any
line of commerce in any section of the country, the effect of such
acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." 7 To ascertain the line of commerce of
an item, a determination must be made as to whether the product
under consideration has such peculiar characteristics 8 and uses
that it can be distinguished from competitors, and whether the
product can be adequately replaced by another competing product.9
A separate determination is required concerning the locality in
which the merger will have an impact,10 both economically and
commercially." The relevant market of a particular product is
then discovered by combining the above determinations.
In reviewing the cases in which relevant market is defined,
it seems that the definitions presented are often unpredictably im-
plemented. Thus, in United States v. Continental Can Co.,'2 the
Court found that glass and metal containers were not functionally
interchangeable. Nonetheless, it held that since the two types of
containers sometimes competed with each other, they constituted
a single line of commerce despite the fact that there were other
materials which could also conceivably compete with glass and
metal. The Court's apparently illogical application of these defini-
tions is illustrated by comparing Continental Can Co. with the de-
cision in United States v. Aluminum Co. of America.13  In the
latter case, although aluminum and copper were virtually inter-
changeable as conductors and there was competition between them,
the Court held that the two products were in separate lines of
commerce because there was a price difference between the two
materials. With this kind of rationale, the Court has demon-
strated a susceptibility for making a finding of a relevant market
antagonistic to the challenged merger.
rE.g., Arrow-Hart & Hegeman Elec. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 589 (1934);
Western Meat Co. v. FTC, 272 U.S. 554 (1926).
6 64 Stat. 1125 (1950), 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964).
738 Stat 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). (Emphasis
added.)8 United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271 (1964).
1 See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
10United States v. Philadelphia Natl Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (the
relevant geographic market was defined as the four county area rather than
the whole northeastern section of the country).
21 Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 336-37 (1962).
l2 Supra note 8.
l 3 Supra note 8.
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When the threshold question of relevant market is answered,
and the proposed merger is found to be capable of having adverse
effects on competition, it has been the practice of the courts to
require proof that such adverse effects have resulted or will result.
This proof has, in the past, been found through the application of
various tests designed to determine whether the acquisition or
merger would have a "reasonable probability" 14 of substantially
lessening competition.
The degree of concentration resulting from the merger in the
market involved has been an important factor in deciding whether
such a merger violates section 7. Perhaps the most important
issue to be considered in this test is the number of competitors
within the relevant market. In United States v. Bethlehem Steel
Corp.,'5 the combination led to the concentration of eighty-three per
cent of the industry among eleven competitors instead of the orig-
inal twelve. Where a merger contributes to this kind of undue
concentration, the courts have held it to be illegal and have ordered
divestiture.'4
Closely related to the degree of concentration test is the market
share foreclosure test. The market share of the two merging com-
panies is important because the closer the market share approaches
monopolistic proportions, the more likely it will adversely affect
competition. In 1963, the Supreme Court, in United States v.
Philadelphia Natl Bank,-" prescribed a presumption of illegality
when the market share foreclosure is approximately thirty per cent.
Subsequent cases have generally adhered to this guideline.' 8 The
market share foreclosure test is usually considered with other com-
petitive factors such as the static or dynamic nature of the market.
In a static market, where the competition and the number and
identity of the competitors have remained in a constant equilibrium
for some time, anticompetitive effect has been found for even com-
paratively slight acquisitions increasing market share.' 9 In addi-
14 The words "may be" in the statute have been construed to mean
"reasonable probability" rather than a "mere possibility." International Shoe
Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1930); Pennsylvania R.R. v. ICC, 66 F2d 37
(3d Cir. 1933), aff'd, 291 U.S. 651 (1934).
15 168 F. Supp. 576 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
"O Ibid. But see E. L. Bruce Co. v. Empire Millwork Corp., 164 F. Supp.
446 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (here the industry leader's [8%.] acquisition of a
competitor [5%] was held not to be a violation where there were 170 com-
petitors in the field).
'1 Supra note 10 at 364.
Is United States v. Continental Can Co., supra note 8 (25%. market share
foreclosure); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 8(29.1% market share foreclosure).
29 United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., supra note 15; American
Crystal Sugar Co. v. Cuban-American Sugar Co., 152 F. Supp. 387 (S.D.N.Y.
1957), aft'd, 259 F.2d 524 (2d Cir. 1958); Pillsbury Mills, Inc., TRADE R.-
REP. 1[29277, at 37617 (FTC Order Dec. 16, 1960).
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tion, it has been held that the elimination of a potential competitor,
without regard to percentage increases, can be illegal.20  In an
industry which is dynamic and where entry into the industry is
relatively easy, mergers would be less prone to cause violations21
since a new entrant can replace the acquired company. The new
entrant must, of course, be a competitive threat and be able to
replace the competition lost through the merger 2
In recognizing the fact that merely using the quantitative tests
outlined above may not be sufficient to implement the legislative
intent behind Section 7 of the Clayton Act, the Court in Brown
Shoe Co. v. United States 23 formulated the incipiency doctrine.
This doctrine applies to situations wherein the merger itself may
not constitute a violation, but may indicate a trend toward eventual
monopolistic concentration. Once such a trend has been sub-
stantiated, the fact that competition remains vigorous, even after
the merger, is not important. In such cases, it is not the im-
mediate but rather the long-range effect on the market that is of
primary importance.
In the Brown Shoe case, the Court recognized certain in-
stances where section 7 would not be applicable, even though, when
examined with respect to the various tests outlined above, the
challenged merger would seem to be a violation of the statute. One
instance of non-applicability usually involves a balancing of in-
terests, i.e., the preservation of competition balanced against other
social, economic or competitive interests.2 4  Often a merger which
would appear to violate section 7, has, at the same time, counter-
vailing benefits which outweigh the adverse effects on competition.
A merger may be allowed when it is demonstrated that small com-
panies must combine to enable them to compete more meaningfully
with those dominating the field. This defense, however, has usually
not been accepted because it leads to upward competition and tends
toward an oligopoly.2 5
Perhaps the most commonly accepted defense is the "failing
company" doctrine?8 This defense is valid even if the acquisition
concentrates an undue proportion of the market in the acquiring
company2 7 International Shoe Co. v. FTC2 s relied on three con-
20United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964); United
States v. El Paso Natural Gas Co., 376 U.S. 651 (1964).
21 United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y.
1960).
22 Crown Zellerbach Corp., TRADE REG. REP. 126923, at 36457 (FTC
Order Dec. 26, 1957), aff'd, 296 F.2d 800 (9th Cir. 1961).23 Supra note 9.
24 Supra note 9, at 331.25 Singer, Cowept of Relative Cotwentration in Antitrnust Law, 52 A.B.A.J.
246, 248 (1966).
26 Note, The ABC's of Clayton 7, 10 ViL. L. REv. 734, 783 (1965).
27 United States v. Lever Bros. Co., 216 F. Supp. 887 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
2S280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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ditions which were present in holding this defense to be operative:
(1) the acquired company was on the verge of total business
failure; (2) there was no other available purchaser; and (3) the
purpose of the acquisition was not to lessen competition but rather
to help the failing company. The situation must be so serious that
had the merger or acquisition not occurred there would be a rea-
sonable probability of insolvency.2 9 The reason given is that the
preservation of a company in business for the benefits which it can
provide the community is more important than the elimination of
possible adverse effects on competition.
In the application of these various tests and defenses, the
Court has usually not given controlling importance to the result of
any one given test. Rather, it has attempted an analysis of the
entire economic picture and tried to use several tests together in
order to determine whether there is a "reasonable probability" that
the challenged merger will be detrimental to competition.
In the instant case, the Court found that the merger brought
about a decrease in the number of competitors in a market which
had a history bf increasing concentration. During a ten-year period
prior to the merger, single proprietorships had decreased from
5,365 to 3,818 and the number of chain stores had increased from
96 to 150. Also during a similar period, 9 of the top 20 chains
acquired 126 stores from smaller competitors.
After viewing the history of antitrust legislation, the majority
concluded that the facts of the instant case presented precisely the
threatening trend toward concentration which Congress wanted to
halt. Although competition was vigorous before and after the
merger, the Court reasoned that section 7 "requires not merely an
appraisal of the immediate impact of the merger upon competition,
but a prediction of its impact upon competitive conditions in thefuture. .... ,, 30
In a vigorous dissent, Mr. Justice Stewart pointed out that
the district court, which made the findings of fact, did not hold that
the merger was anticompetitive in nature. He stated that the
majority based its holding on the sole factor that the number of
individual competitors in the market had decreased over the years.
He claimed that other economic factors should have been con-
sidered, i.e., "the economic concentration of the market, the level
of competition in the market, or the potential adverse effect of the
merger on that competition." 31 In his view, the majority had done
away with the criterion of "reasonable probability" in evaluating
the results of the various tests.
If one were to study the standards for "reasonable probability"
as set down by prior cases, it might be concluded that the instant
29Id. at- 302.30
"United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U,5. _270, 278 (1966).
31 Id. at 283.
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case has dealt a death blow to this concept. In applying the in-
cipiency doctrine, the majority implied that merely a trend toward
a decrease in the number of competitors, prima facie, constitutes a
violation. It did not require proof that such a trend had a "rea-
sonable probability" of substantially lessening competition.
The ease of entry test was completely ignored in the majority
opinion. The dissent showed that although there was an increase
from ten to twenty-four chains of ten or more stores during the
decade prior to the merger, seven of those twenty-four chains were
not even in existence in 1953. In view of the facts that the market
appears to be highly dynamic and there are about 150 competitors,
the slight increase in market share among the top eight competitors,
from 40.9 per cent in 1958 to 44 per cent in 1960, when the merger
occurred, would probably not be illegal under the standards of
"reasonable probability" as defined by the prior decisions. As was
pointed out earlier, United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank 32 and
other cases 33 have made a presumption of illegality when the per-
centage of market share foreclosed by the merging companies
amounted to about 30 per cent. In the instant case, the market
share foreclosed was only 7.5 per cent.34
If one were to apply the elimination of a substantial com-
petitor test, there would be some question as to the status of Shop-
ping Bag, the acquired company, as a substantial competitor.
Both the majority and dissenting opinions recognized that, al-
though it did not qualify as a failing company under the criteria
adopted by the International Shoe Ca. v. FTC3 case, nonetheless,
the competition that it could afford is questionable. Further proof
may be necessary to establish this conclusively, but it seems doubt-
ful that the elimination of Shopping Bag as a competitor necessarily
had a reasonably probable adverse effect on competition.
Although the Court, in the instant case, has probably not dis-
carded the "reasonable probability" standard, its interpretation goes
far beyond prior decisions. It appears that this standard has been
greatly broadened and criteria supporting illegality have been
created where none had existed before. The decision is dangerous
in that under the principles expounded, theoretically, any merger
might be illegal. As a consequence, the practitioner has been
stripped of many of the guidelines formerly utilized in advising
32 Supra note 10, at 321.33Supra note 18.
34 See United States v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co., 240 F. Supp.
867, 932 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (the court held that 13.89% market share fore-
closure could not constitute a presumption of illegality). There is a trend
in Supreme Court decisions which has resulted in a systematic decrease of thres-
hold percentage of market foreclosure. In a very recent case, United States v.
Pabst Brewing Co., 34 U.S.L. WE=x 4516 (U.S. June 13, 1966), the market
share foreclosure was 4.49%.
a 280 U.S. 291 (1930).
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his clients. The incipiency doctrine and the test dealing with elimi-
nation of substantial competitors have been made presumptions of
illegality rather than aids in determining whether there is a "rea-
sonable probability" of adverse effects on competition. Undoubtedly,
the Court will not allow the rationale of the instant case to be
extended ad infinitum, but in the meantime, absent further clarifica-
tion, the law has become doubtful. Perhaps the fault of this deci-
sion lies in the fact that it should have been tempered with con-
siderations of other relevant economic factors.
The history of litigation under the Celler-Kefauver Amend-
ment to Section 7 of the Clayton Act has demonstrated an in-
creasingly antagonistic attitude on the part of the Supreme Court
toward mergers and acquisitions which may have anticompetitive
characteristics. The instant case led Mr. Justice Stewart to say
in his dissent that the only underlying principle of the majority
opinion must be that "in litigation under § 7, the Government always
wins." 36
X
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW- VOTING RIGHTS ACT OF 1965 -
PROVISIONS INVOLVED HELD CONSTITUTIONAL AS APPROPRIATE
MEANS FOR IMPLEMENTING FIFTEENTH AMENDMENT. - The State
of South Carolina brought an action to enjoin the United States At-
torney General from enforcing the provisions of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965 1 which deal with the suspension of eligibility tests, the
appointment of federal examiners, and the review of proposed changes
in state voting qualifications. The Supreme Court, upholding the con-
stitutionality of the provisions of the act before it, held that they
were appropriate means for carrying out congressional responsi-
bilities under the fifteenth amendment, and were consonant with all
other relevant constitutional requirements. South Carolina v.
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966).
A major responsibility of Congress is to provide appropriate
implementation of the guarantees of the fifteenth amendment.
Adopted in 1870, this amendment provides that the right to vote
"shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude." 2
In May 1870, immediately after ratification of the fifteenth amend-
ment, a statute was enacted to enforce the right to vote in federal
36 Supra note 30, at 301.
1 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973-75 (hereinafter cited as Voting Rights
Act of 1965).2 U.S. CoNsr. amend. XV, § 1.
[ VOL. 41
